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A p r i l 10, 1991

Geoffrey J, Butler, Clerk
Utah Supreme Court
33 2 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

R o b e r t s o n , ^ t a l . v - G e m I n s u r a n c e Company
Case No~7~|8^WP
Lower Court C i v i l No. CV 891505
Our F i l e No. 740.037

Dear Mr. B u t l e r :

91-^214-0

Defendant/Appellee Gem Insurance Company filed its Brief of
Appellee on March 11, 1991 in the above-referenced matter.
Plaintiffs/Appellants Jackie and Craig Robertson's Reply Brief is
due on April 15, 1991. Since Gem filed its Appellee's Brief, Gem
has learned of two United States Supreme Court cases and one Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals case that are particularly relevant to one
of the main issues of this appeal. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule
24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Gem submits this
letter citing supplemental authorities, with nine copies.
The cases are the following:
1.

FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 59 U.s.L.W. 4009 (November 27,
1990);

2.

Inqersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S.Ct. 478 (December
3, 1990); and

3.

Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Cc^, No. 89-3242 (10th Cir.
March 5, 1991).

Pages 7 through 14 of Plaintiffs1 Brief and pages 13 through
32 of Defendant's Brief, concern the issue of ERISA pre-emption,
and whether Plaintiffs' causes of action for breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of
emotional distress and punitive damages are pre-empted by ERISA,
as the Lower Court determined in granting Gem's Motion for Partial
Dismissal below. The cases cited above examine the history and
scope of ERISA pre-emption with regard to state laws and common law

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk
April 10, 1991
Page 2

causes of action, where there is an employee welfare benefit plan
in existence. The Tenth Circuit Court Settles case is particularly
relevant in that the Tenth Circuit Court affirmed the Federal
District Court for the District of Kansas' order dismissing
plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to defendant's motion to
dismiss, as happened in the case on appeal here.
A copy of each of the three cases cited above is attached
hereto for the convenience of the Court.
We would appreciate your forwarding this citation of
supplemental authorities on to the Court. Thank you for your
attention to this matter.
Very truly yours,
WILKINS, ORITT & RONNOW

JRO:jb
Enclosures
cc: Jeffery C. Peatross, Esq. (2 copies)
Jeffrey L. Gabardi, Esq.
CLERK-SC.LTR
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November 27 1990

OPINIONS ANNOUNCED NOVEMBER 27,
The Supreme Court

decided:

PENSIONS AND BENEFITS—Pre-emption
Pennsylvania statute that precludes, in any action arising out
of motor vehicle use, reimbursement from claimant's tort recovery of any benefits paid by "any program, group contract or
other arrangement," is pre-empted by Employee Retirement
Income Security Act insofar as it applies to self-funded emplovee welfare beneht plans (FMC Corp v Holhday, No 89-1048)
Page 4009

PUBLIC UTILITIES—Federal Power Act
Section 318 of Federal Power Act, which governs overlapping
jurisdiction of Securities and Exchange Commission and Federal
Energy Rt&uA&tocy CQcarcussiou m cegulauau of power companies under Public Utility Holding Company Act and Federal
Power Act, specifies that SEC regulation will prevail "with
respect to" four enumerated categories of parallel agency authority, and phrase "any other subject matter" at end of fourth
category must be read to modify only those matters covered in
fourth category, not to create independent category with respect
to which SEC jurisdiction will prevail, accordingly, Section 318
does not apply to case in which SEC authorized power company
to purchase coal from SEC-approved affiliate at price equal to
affiliate's actual costs and F E R C subsequently declared such
charges to be unreasonable and thus unrecoverable in wholesale
power rates (Arcadia, Ohio v Ohio Power Co, No 89-1283)
Page 4015
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No. 89-1048

FMC CORPORATION, PETITIONER v. CYNTHIA
ANN HOLLIDAY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Syllabus
No. 89-1048. Argued October 2, 1990-Decided November 27, 1990

Volume 59 No 21

1990

program, group con:ract, or ctner arrangement —prohibits FMC's exercise of suDrogation rights. Tre Court of Appeals affirmed holding :.iat
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), wmch
applies to employee welfare cenen: plans such as FMC's. Goes not oreempt § 1720.
Held ERISA pre-empt3 the application of § 1720 to ~MC's Plan.
(a) ERISA's pre-emption cause oroadly estaDhshes as an area of exclusive federal concern the subject of every state law that -eiate[sj :o ' a
covered employee benefit plan. Althougn the statute's sav _rg clause returns to the States the power :o enforce those state laws tr-a: 'reguiatfe]
insurance," the deemer clause orovides that a covered plar snail not oe
"deemed to De an insurance company or other insurer
or to oe engaged in tne Dusiness of insurance ' for purposes of state *a vs 'ourDorting to regulate" insurance corDan.es or insurance contracts
(b) Section 1720 urelate(s] to" an employee oenefit olan witnin *re
meaning of ERISA's pre-empr.on provision, since it has oo:i a connection with" and a "reference to" such a plan. See Shaw v Delta Air
Lint*, Inc , 463 U. S. 85, 96-97 Moreover, although tne re is no disputA that h 172.Q tiT<><gulaxes> ^r^ararvca," ERISA'* c^emex t^us^ d^raonstrates Congress' dear intent to exclude from the reach or the saving
clause self-funded ERISA plans oy relieving them from state laws "purporting to regulate insurance " Thus, such plans are exernt iron state
regulation insofar as it "relates to" them. State laws directed foward
sucn plans are pre-empted because they relate to an emotovee oenent
plan out are not "saved" because tr.ey do not regulate insurance State
laws that directly regulate insurance are "saved" but do not reacn seiffunded plans Decause the plans may not be deemed to oe insurance companies, other insurers, or engaged in the business of insurance for purposes of such laws. On the other hand, plans that are nsured are
subject to indirect state insurance regulation insofar as state laws "purporting to regulate insurance" apply to the plans' insurers and tne insurers' insurance contracts. This reading of the deemer clause j consistent
with Metropolitan Life Ins Co v. Massachusetts, 471 U S 724. 735,
n. 14, 747, and is respectful of the presumption that Congress does not
intend to pre-empt areas of traditional state regulation, see Jones v
Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525, including regulation of the "business of insurance," see Metropolitan Life Ins Co v Massachusetts,
supra, at 742-744. Narrower readings of the deemer clause—which
would interpret the clause to except from the saving clause only state
insurance regulations that are pretexts for impinging on core ERISA
concerns or to preclude States from deeming plans to be insurers only for
purposes of state laws that apply to insurance as a business, such as laws
relating to licensing and capitalization requirements —are unsupported
by ERISA's language and would be fraught with administrative difficulties, necessitating definition of core ERISA concerns and of what constitutes business activity and thereby undermining Congress expressed
desire to avoid endless litigation over the validity of state act*on and requiring plans to expend funds in such litigation.
885 F. 2d 79, vacated and remanded

After petitioner FMC Corporation's self-funded health care plan (Plan)
paid a portion of respondent's medical expenses resulting from an automobile accident, FMC informed respondent that it would seek reimbursement under the Plan's subrogation provision from any recovery
she realized in her Pennsylvania negligence action against the driver of
the vehicle in which she was injured. Respondent obtained a declaratory judgment in Federal District Court that 5 1720 of Pennsylvania's
Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law—which precludes reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery for benefit payments by a

delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case calls upon the Court to decide whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), SS

NOTICE These opinions arc subject to formal revision before publication
in the prelimmarv print of the United btates Reports Readers arc requested
to notif) the Reporter of Decisions Supreme Court of the Lnitcd States.
Washington DC 20543 o( any typographical or other formal errors in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press

NOTE Where il is deemed desirable, a syllabus ihcadnote) *ill be
released • • • at the lime ihe opinion ts issued The ssllabui cooiiiuies no
part ot the opinion of the Court but has been prepared b\ ihe Reporter ol
Decisions for the convenience of the trader Sec Lntied States
Detroit
Lumber Co 200 U S 321. 337

O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST,
C. J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ ,

joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. SOUTER, J , took no part
in the consideration or decision of the case.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR
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Stat 829, as amended, 29 U S C § 1001 et seq , pre-empts a
Pennsylvania law precluding employee welfare benefit plans
from exercising subrogation rights on a claimant's tort
re:overy

r
Petitioner FMC Corporation (FMC), operates the FMC
Salaried Health Care Plan (Plajp an employee welfare benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA, §3(1), 29 U S C
§1002(1), that provides health oenefits to FMC employees
and their dependents The Plan is self funded, it does not
purcnase an insurance policy from any insurance company m
order to satisfy its ooligations to its participants Among its
provisions is a suorogation clause under which a Plan member agrees to reimburse the Plan for benefits paid if the member recovers on a claim in a haoibt> action against a third
party
Respondent, Cynthia Ann Holhday, is the daughter of
FMC emplo>ee and Plan member Gerald Holhday In 1987,
sh2 was seriously injured in an automobile accident
The
PI in paid a portion of her medical expenses Gerald Holhdav brought a negligence action on behalf of his daughter in
Pennsylvania state court against the driver of the automooile
in which she was injured
The parties settled the claim
While the action was pending, FMC notified the Holhdays
that it would seek reimoursement for the amounts it had paid
for respondent's medical expenses The Holhdays replied
that they would not reimburse the Plan, asserting that § 1720
of Pennsylvania's Motor Vehide Financial Responsibility
Law, 75 Pa Cons Stat § 1720 (1987), precludes subrogation
b> FMC Section 1720 states that "[i]n actions arising out of
the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no
right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant's tort
recovery with respect to
benefits
payable under section 1719 " l Section 1719 refers to benefit payments by
"Wny program, group contract or other arrangement " '
Respondent, proceeding in diversity, then sought and received a declaratory judgment m Federal District Court that

Section 1720 of Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility
Law is entitled M[s]ubrogationw and provides
'In actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle,
th(»re shall be no right of subrogation orreimbursementfroma claimant's
tort recovery with respect to workers' compensation benefits, benefits
available under section 1711 (relating to required benefits), 1712 (relating
to availability of benefits) or 1715 (relating to availability of adequate limits) or benefits in lieu thereof paid or payable under section 1719 (relating
to coordination of benefits) n
' Section 1719, entitled M[c]oordinauon of benefits," reads
'(a) General rule —Except for workers' compensation, a policy of insurance issued or delivered pursuant to this subchapter shall be primary
Any program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefit.} such as described in section 1711 (relating to required benefits), 1712(1)
and (2) (relating to availability of benefits) or 1715 (relating to availability
of adequate limits) shall be construed to contain a provision that all benefits
provided therein shall be in excess of and not in duplication of any valid and
collectible first party benefits provided in section 1711, 1712 or 1715 or
workers' compensation
u
(b) Definition.— As used in this section the terra "program, group contract or other arrangement' includes, but is not limited to, benefits payable
by a hospital plan corporation or a professional health service corporation
subject to 40 Pa. C S Ch. 61 (relating to hospital plan corporations) or 63
(relating to professional health services plan corporations) "
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§ 1720 prohibits FMC's exercise of subrogation rights on Holiday's claim against the driver The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed 885 F 2d 79 (1989)
The court held that §1720, unless pre-empted bars FMC
from enforcing its contractual subrogation pro\ision
According to the court, ERISA pre-empts §1720 ii ERISA a
'deemer clause," § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U S C 11144(b)(2)(B)
exempts the Plan from state subrogation laws The Court of
Appeals, citing Northern Group Semnces, Inc v \uto Owners Ins Co , 833 F 2d 85 91-94 (CA6 1987), cen denied
486 U S 1017 (1988), determined that "the aeerrer c'ause
[was] meant mainly to reach back-door a t t e r p t s D> stares *o
regulate core ERISA concerns in the guise of insurance regulation " 885 F 2d, at 86 Pointing out that the Darties had
not suggested that the Pennsylvania antisuDrogation la A
addressed "a core type of ERISA matter wmcn Congress
sought to protect by the preemption provision ' id at 90
the court concluded that the Pennsylvania law is not preempted The Third Circuit's holding conflicts with decisiors
of other Circuit Courts that have construed ERISA s deemer
clause to protect self-funded plans from ail state insurance
regulation
See, e g , Baxter v Lynn, 886 F 2d 182, 156
(CA8 1989), Redly v Blue Cross and Blue Shield Unitea or
Wisconsin, 846 F 2d 416, 425-426 (CA7), cert denied -*S3
U S 856 (1988) We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 493 U S
(1990), and now reverse
II
In determining whether federal law pre-emDts a state statute, we look to congressional mtent "Tre-emDtion may be
either express or implied, and "is compelled whether Con
gress' command is explicitly stated in the statute s language
or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose '
Shaw v Delta Air Lines, Inc , 463 U S 85, 95 (1983) (quoting Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn v De la Cuesta
458 U S 141, 152-153 (1982), in turn quoting Jones v Rath
Packing Co , 430 U S 519, 525 (1977)), see also Chevron
USA
Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Iuc
467 U S 837, 842-843 (1984) ("If the mtent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter, for the court
must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed mtent of Congress" (footnote omitted)) We "begin with the language
employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary
meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative
purpose." Park 'N Fly, Inc v Dollar Park and Fly, Inc ,
469 U S 189, 194 (1985) Three provisions of ERISA speak
expressly to the question of pre-emption
"Except as provided m subsection (b) of this section
[the saving clause], the provisions of this subchapter
and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan." § 514(a), as set
forth in 29 U S. C § 1144(a) (pre-emption clause)
"Except as provided m subparagraph (B) [the deemer
clause], nothing m this subchapter shall be construed to
exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities"
§ 514(b)(2)(A), as set forth m 29 U. S. C § 1144(b)(2)(A)
(saving clause).
"Neither an employee benefit plan .
nor any trust
established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an
insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust corn-

Published each Tuesday except first Tuesday in September and last Tuesday in December by The Bureau of National Affairs Inc 1231
Twenty-Fifth Street, N W , Washington D C 20037 Subscription rates (payable in advance) $588 00 first year and S560 00 per year thereafter Second class postage paid at Washington, D C , and at additional mailing offices
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pany, or investment company or to be engaged in the
business of insurance or banking for purposes of any
law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contract, banks, trust companies, or
investment companies." § 514(b)(2)(B), as set forth in
29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (deemer clause).
We indicated in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724 (1985), that these provisions "are not a
model of legislative drafting." Id., at 739. Their operation
is nevertheless discernible. The pre-emption clause is conspicuous for its breadth. It establishes as an area of exclusive federal concern the subject of every state law that "relatefs] to" an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA.
The saving clause returns to the States the power to enforce
those state laws that "regulat[e] insurance," except as provided in the deemer clause. Under the deemer clause, an
employee benefit plan governed by ERISA shall not be
"deemed" an insurance company, an insurer, or engaged in
the business of insurance for purposes of state laws "purporting to regulate" insurance companies or insurance contracts.
Ill
Pennsylvania's antisubrogation law "relate[s] to" an employee benefit plan. We made clear in SJww v. Delta Air
Lines, supra, that a law relates to an employee welfare plan
if it has "a connection with or reference to such a plan." Id.,
at 96-97 (footnote omitted). We based our reading in part
on the plain language of the statute. Congress used the
words "'relate to' in § 514(a) [the pre-emption clause] in their
broad sense." Id., at 98. It did not mean to pre-empt only
state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit
plans. That interpretation would have made it unnecessary
for Congress to enact ERISA § 514(b)(4), 29 U. S. C.
§ 1144(b)(4), wrhich exempts from pre-emption "generally" applicable criminal laws of a State. We also emphasized that to
interpret the pre-emption clause to apply only to state laws
dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA, such as
reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary duties, would be incompatible with the provision's legislative history because the
House and Senate versions of the bill that became ERISA
contained limited pre-emption clauses, applicable only to
state laws relating to specific subjects covered by ERISA.'
These were rejected in favor of the present language in the
Act, "indicating] that the section's pre-emptive scope was as
broad as its language." Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U. S.,
at 98.
Pennsylvania's antisubrogation law has a "reference" to
benefit plans governed by ERISA. The statute states that
"[i]n actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle, there shall be no right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery with respect to . . .
benefits . . . paid or payable under section 1719." 75 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 1720 (1987). Section 1719 refers to "[a]ny program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of
benefits." These terms "includfe], but [are] not limited to,

'The bill introduced in the Senate and reported out of the Committer
on Labor and Public Welfare would have pre-empted "any and all laws of
the States and of political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act." S. 4, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., 5 609(a) (1973). As introduced in the House, the bill that
became ERISA would have superseded Many and all laws of the Sutes and
of the political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to thefiduciary,reporting, and disclosure responsibilities of persons
acting on behalf of employee benefit plans." H. R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 114 (1973). The bill was approved by the Committee on Education and
Labor in a slightly modified form. See H. R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 514(a) (1973).
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benefits payable by a hospital plan corporation or a professional health service corporation." § 1719 (emphasis added).
The Pennsylvania statute also has a "connection" to
ERISA benefit plans. In the past, we have not hesitated to
apply ERISA's pre-emption clause to state laws that risk
subjecting plan administrators to conflicting state regulations. See, e. g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, supra, at 95-100
(state laws making unlawful plan provisions that discriminate
on the basis of pregnancy and^quirjng flans to provide specific benefits "relate to" benef.: plans); Alessi v. RaybestosManhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504, 523-526 (1981) (state law
prohibiting plans from reducing benefits by amount of workers' compensation awards "relates] to" employee benefit
plan). To require plan providers to design their programs in
an environment of differing State regulations would complicate the administration of na::onwide plans, producing inefficiencies that employers might offset with decreased benefits. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U. S. 1.
10 (1987). Thus, where a "patchwork scheme of regulation
would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation," we have applied the pre-emption clause to
ensure that benefit plans will be governed by only a single set
of regulations. Id., at 11.
Pennsylvania's antisubrogation law prohibits plans from
being structured in a manner requiring reimbursement in the
event of recovery from a third parry. It requires plan providers to calculate benefit levels in Pennsylvania based on expected liability conditions that differ from those in States
that have not enacted similar antisubrogation legislation.
Application of differing state subrogation laws to plans would
therefore frustrate plan administrators' continuing obligation
to calculate uniform benefit levels nationwide. Accord.
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., supra (state statute
prohibiting offsetting worker compensation payments against
pension benefits pre-empted since statute would force employer either to structure all benefit payments in accordance
with state statute or adopt different payment formulae for
employers inside and outside State). As we stated in Fort
Halifax, "[t]he most efficient way to meet these (administrative] responsibilities is to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures
to guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits."
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, supra, at 9.
There is no dispute that the Pennsylvania law falls within
ERISA's insurance saving clause, which provides, u[e]xcept
as provided in [the deemer clause], nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person
from any law of any State which regulates insurance,"
§ 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
Section 1720 directly controls the terms of insurance contracts by invalidating any subrogation provisions that they
contain. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 740-741. It
does not merely have an impact on the insurance industry; it
is aimed at it. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S.
41, 50 (1987). This returns the matter of subrogation to
state law. Unless the statute is excluded from the reach of
the saving clause by virtue of the deemer clause, therefore, it
is not pre-empted.
We read the deemer clause to exempt self-funded ERISA
plans from state laws that "regulat[e] insurance" within the
meaning of the saving clause. By forbidding States to deem
employee benefit plans "to be an insurance company or other
insurer . . . or to be engaged in the business of insurance."
the deemer clause relieves plans from state laws "purporting
to regulate insurance." As a result, self-funded ERISA
plans are exempt from state regulation insofar as that regulation "relate[s] to" the plans. State laws directed toward
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the plans are pre-empted because they relate to an employee
benefit plan but are not "saved" because they do not regulate
insurance. State laws that directly regulate insurance are
"saved" but do not reach self-funded employee benefit plans
because the plans may not be deemed to be insurance companies, other insurers, or engaged in the business of insurance
for purposes of such state laws. On the other hand, employee benefit plans that are insured are subject to indirect
state insurance regulation. An insurance company that insures a plan remains an insurer for purposes of state laws
"purporting to regulate insurance" after application of the
deemer clause. The insurance company is therefore not relieved from state insurance regulation. The ERISA plan is
consequently bound by state insurance regulations insofar as
they apply to the plan's insurer.
Our reading of the deemer clause is consistent with Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, supra. That case involved a Massachusetts statute requiring certain self-funded
benefit plans and insurers issuing group-health policies to
plans to provide minimum mental-health benefits. Id., at
734. In pointing out that Massachusetts had never tried to
enforce the portion of the statute pertaining directly to benefit plans, we stated, "[i]n light of ERISA's 'deemer clause,'
which states that a benefit plan shall not 'be deemed an insurance company" for purposes of the insurance saving clause,
Massachusetts has never tried to enforce [the statute] as
applied to benefit plans directly, effectively conceding that
such an application of [the statute] would be pre-empted by
ERISA's pre-emption clause." Id., at 735, n. 14 (citations
omitted). We concluded that the statute, as applied to insurers of plans, was not pre-empted because it regulated
insurance and was therefore saved. Our decision, we acknowledged, "results in a distinction between insured and
uninsured plans, leaving the former open to indirect regulation while the latter are not." Id., at 747. "By so doing, we
merely give life to a distinction created by Congress in the
'deemer clause,' a distinction Congress is aware of and one it
has chosen not to alter." Ibid, (footnote omitted).
Our construction of the deemer clause is also respectful of
the presumption that Congress does not intend to pre-empt
areas of traditional state regulation. See Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U. S., at 525. In the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq., Congress provided that the
"business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate
to the regulation or taxation of such business." 15 U. S. C.
§ 1012(a). We have identified laws governing the "business
of insurance" in the Act to include not only direct regulation
of the insurer but also regulation of the substantive terms of
insurance contracts. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, supra, at 742-744. By recognizing a distinction between insurers of plans and the contracts of those insurers,
which are. subject to direct state regulation, and self-insured
employee benefit plans governed by ERISA, which are not,
we observe Congress' presumed desire to reserve to the
States the regulation of the "business of insurance."
Respondent resists our reading of the deemer clause and
would attach to it narrower significance. According to the
deemer clause, "[n]either an employee benefit plan . . . nor
any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to
be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any
State purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] insur„ eri wuwovm 9Q TT S_ C. § 1144(b)(2)(B)
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would interpret the deemer clause to except from the saving
clause only state insurance regulations that are pretexts for
impinging upon core ERISA concerns. The National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as amici curiae in support
of respondent, offer an alternative interpretation of the
deemer clause. In their view, the deemer clause precludes
States from deeming plans to be insurers only for purposes of
state laws that apply to insurance" as a"business, such as laws
relating to licensing and capitalization requirements.
These views are unsupported by ERISA's language.
Laws that purportedly regulate insurance companies or insurance contracts are laws having the "appearance of" regulating or "intending" to regulate insurance companies or
contracts. Black's Law Dictionary 1236 (6th ed. 1990).
Congress' use of the word does not indicate that it directed
the deemer clause solely at deceit that it feared state legislatures would practice. Indeed, the Conference Report, in
describing the deemer clause, omits the word "purporting,"
stating, "an employee benefit plan is not to be considered as
an insurance company, bank, trust company, or investment
company (and is not to be considered as engaged in the business of insurance or banking) for purposes of any State law
that regulates insurance companies, insurance contracts,
banks, trust companies, or investment companies." H. R.
Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 383 (1974).
Nor, in our view, is the deemer clause directed solely at
laws governing the business of insurance. It is plainly directed at "any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies." § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U. S. C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(B). Moreover, it is difficult to understand why
Congress would have included insurance contracts in the
pre-emption clause if it meant only to pre-empt state laws relating to the operation of insurance as a business. To be
sure, the saving and deemer clauses employ differing language to achieve their ends—the former saving, except as
provided in the deemer clause, "any law of any State which
regulates insurance" and the latter referring to "any law of
any State purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] insurance contracts." We view the language of the deemer
clause, however, to be either coextensive with or broader,
not narrower, than that of the saving clause. Our rejection
of a restricted reading of the deemer clause does not lead to
the deemer clause's engulfing the saving clause. As we have
pointed out, supra, at 9, the saving clause retains the independent effect of protecting state insurance regulation of insurance contracts purchased by employee benefit plans.
Congress intended by ERISA to "establish pension plan
regulation as exclusively a federal concern." Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S., at 523 (footnote omitted).
Our interpretation of the deemer clause makes clear that if a
plan is insured, a State may regulate it indirectly through
regulation of its insurer and its insurer's insurance contracts;
if the plan is uninsured, the State may not regulate it. As a
result, employers will not face "'conflicting or inconsistent
State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.'" SJiaw
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S., at 99 (quoting remarks of
Sen. Williams). A construction of the deemer clause that exempts employee benefit plans from only those state regulations that encroach upon core ERISA concerns or that apply
to insurance as a business would be fraught with administrative difficulties, necessitating definition of core ERISA
concerns and of what constitutes business activity. It would
therefore undermine Congress* desire to avoid "endless litigation over the validity of State action," see 120 Cong. Rec.
29942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits), and instead lead to em-
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In view of Congress' clear intent to exempt from direct
state insurance regulation ERISA employee benefit plans,
we hold that ERISA pre-empts the application of § 1720 of
Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law
to the FMC Salaried Health Care Plan. We therefore vacate the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SOUTER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

dissenting.
The Court's construction of the statute draws a broad and
illogical distinction between benefit plans that are funded by
the employer (self-insured plans) and those that are insured
by regulated insurance companies (insured plans). Had
Congress intended this result, it could have stated simply
that "all State laws are pre-empted insofar as they relate to
any self-insured employee plan." There would then have
been no need for the "saving clause" to exempt state insurance laws from the pre-emption clause, or the "deemer
clause." which the Court today reads as merely reinjecting
into the scope of ERISA's pre-emption clause those same exempted state laws insofar as they relate to self-insured plans.
From the standpoint of the beneficiaries of ERISA plans —
who after all are the primary beneficiaries of the entire statutory program—there is no apparent reason for treating selfinsured plans differently from insured plans. Why should a
self-insured plan have a right to enforce a subrogation clause
against an injured employee while an insured plan may not?
The notion that this disparate treatment of similarly situated
beneficiaries is somehow supported by an interest in uniformity is singularly unpersuasive. If Congress had intended
such an irrational result, surely it would have expressed it in
straightforward English. At least one would expect that the
reasons for drawing such an apparently irrational distinction
would be discernible in the legislative history, or in the literature discussing the legislation.
The Court's anomalous result would be avoided by a correct and narrower reading of either the basic pre-emption
clause or the deemer clause.
I
The Court has endorsed an unnecessarily broad reading of
the words "relate to any employee benefit plan" as they are
used in the basic pre-emption clause of § 514(a). I acknowledge that this reading is supported by language in some of
our prior opinions. It is not, however, dictated by any prior
holding and I am persuaded that Congress did not intend this
clause to cut nearly so broad a swath in the field of state laws
as the Court's expansive construction will create.
The clause surely does not pre-empt a host of general rules
of tort, contract, and procedural law that relate to benefit
plans as well as to other persons and entities. It does not,
for example, pre-empt general state garnishment rules insofar as they relate to ERISA plans. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.f 486 U. S. 825 (1988). Moreover, the legislative history of the provision indicates that
throughout most of its consideration of pre-emption, Congress was primarily concerned about areas of possible overlap between federal and state requirements. Thus, the bill
that was introduced in the Senate would have pre-empted
state laws insofar as they "relate to the subject matters reguJUSTICE STEVENS,
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lated by this Act,"1 and the House bill more specifically
identified state laws relating "to the fiduciary, reporting, and
disclosui'e responsibilities of persons acting on behalf of employee benefit plans.": Although the compromise that produced the statutoiy language "relate to any employee benefit
plan" is not discussed in the legislative history, the final version is perhaps best explained as an editorial amalgam of the
two bills rather than as a major expansion of the section's
coverage.
When there is ambiguity in a statutory provision preempting state law, we should apply a strong presumption
against-the invalidation of well-settled, generally applicable
state rules. In my opinion this presumption played an important role in our decisions in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne, 482 U. S. 1 (1987), and Mackey v. Lanier Collection
Agency & Service, Inc., supra. Application of that presumption leads me to the conclusion that the pre-emption
clause should apply only to those state laws that purport to
regulate subjects regulated by ERISA or that are inconsistent with ERISA's central purposes. I do not think Congress
intended to foreclose Pennsylvania from enforcing the antisubrogation provisions of its state Motor Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Act against ERISA plans— most certainly it
did not intend to pre-empt enforcement of that statute
against self-insured plans while preserving enforcement
against insured plans.
II
Even if the "relate to" language in the basic pre-emption
clause is read broadly, a proper interpretation of the carefully drafted text of the deemer clause would caution against
finding pre-emption in this case. Before identifying the key
words in that text, it is useful to comment on the history surrounding enactment of the deemer clause.
The number of self-insured employee benefit pians grew
dramatically in the 1960's and early 1970's.1 The question
whether such plans were, or should be, subject to state regulation remained unresolved when ERISA was enacted. It
was, however, well recognized as early as 1967 that requiring
self-insured plans to comply with the regulatory requirements in state insurance codes would stifie their growth:
"Application of state insurance laws to uninsured plans
would make direct payment of benefits pointless and in
most cases not feasible. This is because a welfare plan
would have to be operated as an insurance company in
order to comply with the detailed regulatory requirements of state insurance codes designed with the typical
operations of insurance companies in mind. It presumably would be necessary to form a captive insurance
company with prescribed capital and surplus, capable of
obtaining a certificate of authority from the insurance
department of all states in which the plan was 'doing
business,' establish premium rates subject to approval
by the insurance department, issue policies in the form
approved by the insurance department, pay commissions
and premium taxes required by the insurance law, hold
and deposit reserves established by the insurance department, make investments permitted under the law,
and comply with allfilingand examination requirements
of the insurance department. The result would be to rel
S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 609(a) (1973), reprinted a: 1 Legislative
History of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (Committee Print compiled by the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare) 93, 1S6 (1976) (Leg. Hist.).
X
H. R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 114 (1973); 1 Leg. Hist. 51.
'See Comment, State Regulation of Noninsured Employee Welfare
Benent Plans, 62 Geo. L. J. 339, 340 (1973).
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introduce an insurance company, which the direct payment plan was designed to dispense with. Thus it can
be seen that the real issue is not whether uninsured
plans are to be regulated under state insurance laws, but
whether they are to be permitted." Goetz, Regulation
of Uninsured Employee Welfare Plans Under State Insurance Laws, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 319, 320-321 (emphasis
in original).
In 1974 while ERISA was being considered in Congress,
the first state court to consider the applicability of state insurance laws to self-insured plans held that a self-insured
plan could not pay out benefits until it had satisfied the licensing requirements governing insurance companies in Missouri
and thereby had subjected itself to the regulations contained
in the Missouri insurance code. Missouri v. Monsanto Co.,
Cause No. 259774 (St. Louis Cty. Cir. Ct.f Jan. 4, 1973),
revU 517 S. W. 2d 129 (Mo. 1974). Although it is true that
the legislative history of ERISA or the deemer clause makes
no reference to the Missouri case, or to this problem—indeed, it contains no explanation whatsoever of the reason for
enacting the deemer clause—the text of the clause itself
plainly reveals that it was designed to protect pension plans
from being subjected to the detailed regulatory provisions
that typically apply to all state-regulated insurance companies—laws that purport to regulate insurance companies and
insurance contracts.
The key words in the text of the deemer clause are
"deemed," "insurance company," and "purporting."* It provides that an employee welfare plan shall not be deemed to be
an insurance company or to be engaged in the business of insurance for the purpose of determining whether it is an entity
that is regulated by any state law purporting to regulate insurance companies and insurance contracts.
Pennsylvania's insurance code purports, in so many words,
to regulate insurance companies and insurance contracts. It
governs the certification of insurance companies, Pa. Stat.
Ann., Tit. 40, §400 (Purdon 1971), their minimum capital
stock and financial requirements to do business, § 386 (Purdon 1971 and Supp. 1990-1991), their rates, e. g.f §532.9
(Purdon 1971) (authorizing Insurance Commissioner to regulate minimum premiums charged by life insurance companies), and the terms that insurance policies must, or may, include, e. g„ §510 (Purdon 1971 and Supp. 1990-1991) (life
insurance policies), §753 (Purdon 1971) (health and accident
insurance policies). The deemer clause prevents a State
from enforcing such laws purporting to regulate insurance
companies and insurance contracts against ERISA plans
merely by deeming ERISA plans to be insurance companies.
But the fact that an ERISA plan is not deemed to be an insurance company for the purpose of deciding whether it must
comply with a statute that purports to regulate "insurance
contracts" or entities that are defined as "insurance companies" simply does not speak to the question whether it must
nevertheless comply with a statute that expressly regulates
subject matters other than insurance.
There are many state laws that apply to insurance companies as well as to other entities. Such laws may regulate
some aspects of the insurance business, but do not require
one to be an insurance company in order to be subject to their
'Section 514(bX2XB), as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 1144(bX2)(B),
provides:
"Neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under
such a plan, shall be deemtd to be an insumnce company or other insurer,
bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate ivsumnce companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust
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terms. Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act is such a law. The fact that petitioner's plan is not
deemed to be an insurance company or an insurance contract
does not have any bearing on the question whether petitioner, like all other persons, must nevertheless comply with
the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act.
If one accepts the Court's broad reading of the "relate to"
language in the basic pre-emption*clause* the answer to the
question whether petitioner must* comply with state laws
regulating entities including but not limited to insurance companies depends on the scope of the saving clause.4 In this
case, I am prepared to accept the Court's broad reading of
that clause but it is of critical importance to me that the category of state laws described in the saving clause is broader
than the category described in the deemer clause. A state
law "which regulates insurance," and is therefore exempted
from ERISA's pre-emption provision by operation of the saving clause, does not necessarily have as its purported subject
of regulation an 'insurance company" or an activity that is
engaged in by persons who are insurance companies.
Rather, such a law may aim to regulate another matter altogether, but also have the effect of regulating insurance. The
deemer clause, by contrast, reinjects into the scope of
ERISA pre-emption only those state laws that "purport to"
regulate insurance companies or contracts—laws such as
those which set forth the licensing and capitalization requirements for insurance companies or the minimum required provisions in insurance contracts. While the saving clause thus
exempts from the pre-emption clause all state laws that have
the broad effect of regulating insurance, the deemer clause
simply allows pre-emption of those state laws that expressly
regulate insurance and that would therefore be applicable to
ERISA plans only if States were allowed to deem such plans
to be insurance companies.
Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act
fits into the broader category of state laws that fall within the
saving clause only. The Act regulates persons in addition to
insurance companies, and affects subrogation and indemnity
agreements that are not necessarily insurance contracts.
Yet because it most assuredly is not a law "purporting" to
regulate any of the entities described in the deemer clause—
"insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies," the deemer clause does
not by its plain language apply to this state law. Thus, although the Pennsylvania law is exempted from ERISA's preemption provision by the broad saving clause because it "regulates insurance," it is not brought back within the scope of
ERISA pre-emption by operation of the narrower deemer
clause. I therefore would conclude that petitioner is subject
to Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility
Act.
I respectfully dissent.
H. WOODRUFF TURNER, Pittsburgh, Pa. (CHARLES KELLY.
PATRICK J. MCELHINNY, KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART.
and W. RONALD COOPER, on the briefs) for petitioner. DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, Deputy Solicitor General (KENNETH W. STARR. Sol.
Gen., CHRISTOPHER J. WRIGHT, Asst. to the Sol. Gen., ROBERT P. DAVIS. Sol. of Labor, ALLEN H. FELDMAN, Assoc. Sol.,
STEVEN J. MANDEL, Dpty. Assoc. Sol., and MARK S. FLYNN.
Labor Dept. attv., on the briefs) for U.S. as amicus curiae; CHARLES
ROTHFELD, Washington, D.C. (THOMAS G. JOHNSON. DAVID
A. CICOLA, and BARBOR and CICOLA, on the briefs) for
respondent.
1
Section 514(bX2XA) of ERISA, as set forth in 29 U. S. C.
§ 1144(b)(2XA). provides:
"Except as provided in subparagraph (B) nothing in this subchapter shall
be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
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its provisions, so far as to punish a cnme
not enumerated in the statute, because it
is of equal atrocity, or of kindred character, with those which are enumerated."
United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat.
76, 96, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820).
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully
dissent.

1. Master and Servant ^=^34
States <s=>18.45
ERISA preempted employee's state
law wrongful discharge dafm based on allegation that his discharge was based on
his employer's desire to avoid making contributions to his pension fund. Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
§§ 2 et seq., 502(a), 510, 514, 514(a), (cXD,
as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 et seq.,
1132(a), 1140, 1144, 1144(a), (cXD.
2. States <s=>!8.11
To discern Congress' intent in ruling
on preemption issue, Supreme Court examines explicit statutory language and structure and purpose of statute. •

INGERSOLL-RAND
COMPANY, Petitioner
v.
Perry iMcCLENDON.
No. 89-1298,
Argued Oct 9, 1990.
Decided Dec. 3, 1990.

Employee brought wrongful discharge
action against his former employer. The
183rd District Court, Harris County,Xamar
McCorkle, J., entered summary judgment
in favor of employer, and employee appealed. The Houston Court of Appeals, 14th
District, affirmed, 757 S.W.2d 816, and employee again appealed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and-remanded, 779
S.W.2d 69. Certiorari was granted. The
Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor, held that
ERISA preempted the employee's state law
wrongful discharge claim based on allegation that his discharge was based on his
employer's desire to avoid making contributions to his pension fund.
Reversed.
Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stearic ininpH in nart

3. Pensions <£=>22
States <s=>18.51
State law may "relate to" benefit plan,
and thereby be preempted under ERISA,
even if law is not specifically designed to
affect such plans, or effect is only indirect
Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, § 514(a), (cXl), as amended, 29
U.S.C.A. § 1144(a), (cXD.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
4. Pensions ^=22
States <S=*18.51
Preemption is not precluded simply because state law is consistent with ERISA's
substantive requirements. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
§ 514(a), (cXl), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1144(a), (cXD.
5. Master and Servant <&=>34
States <s=>18.45
Claim that employer wrongfully discharged employee primarily to avoid contributing to or paying benefits under employee's pension fund "relates to" ERISAcovered plan within meaning of ERISA's
preemption provision and is therefore
preempted. Employee Retirement Income

INGERSOLL-RAND CO, v. McCLENDON
Cite as 111 S.Ct. 478 (1990)

Security Act of 1974, § 514(a), as amended,
29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a).
Sec publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

6. Pensions $=>22
States <$=>18.51
Provision of ERISA governing scope
of its preemption provision expanded definition of "state" to include state agencies
and instrumentalities whose actions would
not otherwise be considered state law, and
did not limit preemption to state laws affecting plan terms, conditions, or administration. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 3(10), 514(a), (c)(2),
as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1002(10),
1144(a), (cX2).
7. Master and Servant <3»34
States <$=>18.45
Even if ERISA did not expressly
preempt employee's state law wrongful discharge claim based on allegation that he
was discharged because his employer
wished to avoid paying into pension plan,
claim was impliedly preempted by ERISA
provision prohibiting interference with attainment of any right under pension plan.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, §§ 502(a), (aX3), (e), 510, 514(a), as
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1132(a), (aX3), (e),
1140, 1144(a).
8. Pensions «=>22
States «=*18,51
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that activities which_state purports
to regulate are protected by provision of
ERISA prohibiting interference with attainment of rights under pension plan, due
regard for federal enactment requires that
state jurisdiction must yield. Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
§§ 502(a), 510, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1132(a), 1140.
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the
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9. Pensions <s=>22
States «»18.51
Not only is ERISA provision giving
plan participants civil action to redress violations of ERISA exclusive remedy for vindicating rights protected by provision prohibiting interference with attainments of
rights under pension plan, there is no basis
for limiting ERISA actions onLy to those
which seek pension benefits. Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
§§ 502(a), 510, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1132(a), 1140.
Syllabus *
After petitioner company fired respondent McClendon, he filed a wrongful discharge action under various state law tort
and contract theories, alleging that a principal reason for his termination was the company's desire to avoid contributing to his
pension fund. The Texas court granted the
company summary judgment, and the State
Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that
McClendon's employment was terminable
at will. The State Supreme Court reversed
and remanded for trial, holding that public
policy required recognition of an exception
to the employment-at-wiU doctrine.' Therefore, recovery would be permitted in a
wrongful discharge action if the plaintiff
could prove that "the principal reason for
his termination was the employer's desire
to avoid contributing to or paying benefits
under the employee's pension fund"' In
distinguishing federal cases holding similar
claims pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
the court reasoned that McClendon was
seeking future lost wages, recovery for
mental anguish, and punitive damages
rather than lost pension benefits.
Held: ERISA's explicit language and
its structure and purpose demonstrate a
congressional intent to pre-empt a state
common law claim that an employee was
unlawfully discharged to prevent his attainreader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co.,
200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct 282, 287, 50 L.Ed.
499.
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ment of benefits under an ERISA-covered
plan. Pp. 482-486.
(a) The cause of action in this case is
expressly pre-empted by § 514(a) of
ERISA, which broadly declares that that
statute supersedes all state laws (including
decisions having the effect of law) that
"relate to" any covered employee benefit
plan. In order to prevail on the cause of
action, as formulated by the Texas Supreme Court, a plaintiff must plead, and
the trial court must find, that an ERISA
plan exists and the employer had a pensiondefeating motive in terminating the employment Because the existence of a plan
is a critical factor in establishing liability,
and the trial court's inquiry must be directed to the p)an, this judicially created cause
of action "relatefs] to" an ERISA plan. Cf.
Mockey v. Lanier Collection Agency &
Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 828, 108 S.Ct
2182, 2184, 100 L.Ed.2d 836. Id., at 841,
108 S.Ct, at 2191, and Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 12, 23, 107
S.Ct 2211, 2217-18, 2223-24, 96 L.EoL2d 1
distinguished. In arguing that the plan is
irrelevant to the cause of action because all
that is at issue is the employer's improper
motive, McClendon misses the point, which
is that under the state court's analysis
there simply is no cause of action if there
is no plan- Similarly unavailing is McClendon's argument that § 514(cX2>—which defines "State" to include any state instrumentality purporting to regulate the terms
and conditions of covered plans—causes
§ 514(a) to pre-empt only those state laws
that affect plan terms, conditions, or administration and not those that focus on
the employer's termination decision. That
argument misreads § 514(cX2) and consequently misapprehends its purpose of expanding ERISA's general definition of
"State" to "include" state instrumentalities whose actions might not otherwise be
considered state law for pre-emption purposes; would render § 514(a)'s "relate to"
language superfluous, since Congress need
only have said that "all" state laws would
ho nrp-emDted; and is foreclosed by this

828, and n. 2, 829, 108 S.Ct, at 2184, and n.
2, 2185. Pre-emption here is also supported by § 514(a)'s goal of ensuring uniformity in pension law, since .allowing state
based actions like the one-at issue might
subject plans and plan sponsors to conflicting substantive requirements developed by
the courts of each jurisdiction. Pp. 482485.
(b) The Texas cause of action is also
pre-empted because it conflicts directly
with an ERISA cause of action. McClendon's claim falls squarely within ERISA
§ 510 which prohibits the discharge of a
plan participant "for the purpose of interfering with [his] attainment of any right
. . . under the plan." However, that in
itself does not imply pre-emption of state
remedies absent "special features" warranting pre-emption. See, e.g., English v.
General Electric Co., 496 U.S.
,
,
110 S.Ct 2270,
, 110 L.Ed.2d 65. Such
a "special featurfe]" exists in the form of
§ 502(a), which authorizes a civil action by
a plan participant to enforce ERISA's or
the plan's terms, gives the federal district
courts exclusive jurisdiction of such actions, and has been held to be the exclusive
remedy for rights guaranteed by ERISA,
including those provided by § 510, Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.SL 41, 52,
54-55, 107 S.Ct 1549, 1555-56, 1556-57, 95
L.Ed.2d 39. Thus, the lower court's attempt to distinguish this case as not one
within ERISA's purview is without merit
Moreover, since there is no basis in
§ 502(a)'s language for limiting ERISA actions to only those which seek "pension
benefits," it is clear that the relief requested here is well within the power of federal
courts; the fact that a particular plaintiff
is not seeking recovery of pension benefits
is no answer to a pre-emption argument.
Pp. 484-486.
779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), reversed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion
for a unanimous Court with respect to
Parts I and II-B, and the opinion of the
^ -L . ^ u ^cru^t t n p a r t li-A, in which
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REHNQUIST, CJ., and WHITE, SCALIA,
KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined.
Hollis T. Hurd, Pittsburgh, Pa., for petitioner.
Christopher J. Wright, Washington, D.C.
for the U.S., as amicus curiae, in support of
the petitioner, by special leave of CourtJohn W. Tavormina, Houston, Tex., for
respondent
Justice O'CONNOR delivered the
opinion of the Court**
This case presents the question whether
the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat 829, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., preempts a state common law claim that an
employee was unlawfully discharged to
prevent his attainment of benefits under a
plan covered by ERISA.
I
Petitioner Ingersoll-Rand employed respondent Perry McClendon as a salesman
and distributor of construction equipment
In 1981, after McClendon had worked for
the company for nine years and eight
months, the company fired him citing a
companywide reduction in force. McClendon sued the company in Texas state court,
alleging that his pension would have vested
in another four months and that a principal
reason for his termination was the company's desire to avoid making contributions
to his pension fund. McClendon did not
realize that pursuant to applicable regulations, see 29 CFR § 2530.200t>-4 (1990)
(break-in-service regulation), he had already been credited with sufficient service
to vest his pension under the plan's 10-year
requirement. McClendon sought compen-"Justice MARSHALL, Justice BLACKMUN, and
Justice STEVENS join Parts I and II-B of this
opinion.
t See, e.g.t Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F. 2d 586
(CA1 1989) (ERISA pre-empts state wrongful
discharge actions premised on employer interference with the attainment of rights under employee benefit plans); Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.
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satory and punitive damages under various
tort and contract theories; he did not assert any cause of action under ERISA.
After a period of discovery, the company
moved for, and obtained; summary judgment on all claims. The State Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that McClendon's employment was terminable at will.
757 S.W.2d 816 (1988).
In a 5 to 4 decision, the Texas Supreme
Court reversed and remanded for trial.
The majority reasoned that notwithstanding the traditional employment-at-will doctrine, public policy imposes certain limitations upon an employer's power to discharge at-will employees. Citing Tex.Rev.
Civ.StatAnn., Title HOB (Vernon 1988
pamphlet), and § 510 of ERISA, the majority concluded that "the state has an interest
in protecting employees' interests in pension plans." 779 S.W.2d 69, 71 (1989). As
support the court noted that "[t]he very
passage of ERISA demonstrates the great
significance attached to income security for
retirement purposes/' Ibid Accordingly, the court held that under Texas law a
plaintiff could recover in a, wrongful discharge action if he established that "the
principal reason for his termination was the
employer's desire to avoid contributing to
or paying benefits under the employee's
pension fund." Ibid. The court noted that
federal courts had held similar claims preempted by ERISA, but.-distinguished the
present case on the basis that McCtendon
was "not seeking lost pension benefits but
[was] instead seeking future lost wages,
mental anguish and punitive damages as a
result of the wrongful discharge." Id., at
71, n. 3 (emphasis in original).
Because this issue has divided state and
federal courts/ we granted certiorari, 494
2d 631 (CA3 1989) (same); Sorosky v. Burroughs
Corp., 826 F.2d 794 (CA9 1987) (same). Accord.
Conaway v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., —
W.Va.
, 358 S.E.2d 423 (1986). Contra, K
Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732 ?2d
1364 (1987); Hovey v. Lutheran Medical Center,
516 F^upp. 554 (EDNY 1981); Savodnik v. Kor
vettes, Inc., 4SS F.Supp. 822 (EDNY 1980).
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U.S.
, 110 S.Ct 1804, 108 L.Ed.2d 935
(1990), and now reverse.
II
[1] "ERISA is a comprehensive statute
designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee
benefit plans," Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90, 103 S.Ct 2890, 2896,
77 LEd.2d 490 (1983). 'The statute imposes participation, funding, and vesting requirements on pension plans. It also sets
various uniform standards, including rules
concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility, for both pension and
welfare plans." Id, at 91, 103 S.Ct at
2896 (citation omitted). As part of this
closely integrated regulatory system Congress included various safeguards to preclude abuse and "to completely secure the
rights and expectations brought into being
by this landmark reform legislation."
S.Rep. No. 93-127, p. 36 (1973). Prominent
among these safeguards are three provisions of particular relevance to this case:
§ 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144, ERISA's broad
pre-emption provision; § 510, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1140, which proscribes interference with
rights protected by ERISA; and § 502(a),
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), a " 'carefully integrated' " civil enforcement scheme that "is one
of the essential tools for accomplishing the
"stated purposes of ERISA." Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 US. 41, 52, 54,
107 S.Ct 1549, 1555, 1556-57, 95 LJEtL2d
39 (1987).

language and the structure and purpose of
the statute. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday,
498 U.S.
,
, 111 S.Ct 403, 407,
— L.Ed.2d
(1990),.-(cittirg. Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra, 463 U.S., at
95, 103 S.Ct, at 2898-99). Regardless of
the avenue we follow—whether explicit or
implied pre-emption—this state law cause
of action cannot be sustained.
A
Where, as here, Congress has expressly
included a broadly worded pre-emption provision in a comprehensive statute such as
ERISA, our task of discerning congressional intent is considerably simplified. In
§ 514(a) of ERISA, as set forth in 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a), Congress provided:
"Except as provided in subsection (b)
. of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) of this title
and not exempt under section 1003(b) of
this title/'

'The pre-emption clause is conspicuous
for its breadth." FMC Corp., supra, —
U.S., at
, 111 S.Ct, at 407. Its "deliberately expansive" language was "designed to 'establish pension plan regulation
as exclusively a federal coDcem.':"- Pilot
Life, supra, 481 UA t at 46, 107 S.Ct, 1552
[2] We must decide whether these pro- (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
visions, singly or in combination, pre-empt Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523, 101 S.Ct 1895,
the cause of action at issue -in this case. 1906, 68 LEd.2d 402 (1981)). The key to
"[T]he question whether a certain state ac- § 514(a) is found in the words "relate to."
tion is pre-empted by federal law is one of Congress used those words in their broad
congressional intent The purpose of Con- sense, rejecting more limited pre-emption
gress is the ultimate touchstone/ " A His- language that would have made the clause
Ckalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U. S. 202, "applicable only to state laws relating to
208, 105 S.Ct 1904, 1909-10, 85 L.Ed.2d the specific subjects covered by ERISA."
206 (1985) (internal quotation omitted) Shaw, supra, 463 U.S., at 98, 103 S.Ct, at
(quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 2900-01. Moreover, to underscore its inU.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct 1185, 1189-90, 55 tent that § 514(a) be expansively applied,
L.Ed.2d 443 (1978)). To discern Congress' Congress used equally broad language in
sla-fminrr
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pre-empted. Such laws Include "all laws,
decisions, rules, regulations, or other State
action having the effect of law."
§ 514(cXD, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(cXD.
[3,4] "A law 'relates to' an employee
benefit plan, in the normal sense of the
phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." Shaw, supra, at
9&-97, 103 S.Ct, at 2900. Under this
"broad common-sense meaning," a state
law may "relate to" a benefit plan, and
thereby be pre-empted, even if the law is
not specifically designed to affect such
plans, or the effect is only indirect Pilot
Life, supra, 481 U.S., at 47, 107 S.Ct, at
1552-53. See also Alessi v. RaybestosManhattan, Inc., supra, 451 U.S., at 525,
101 S.Ct, at 1907. Pre-emption is also not
precluded simply because a state law is
consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739, 105 S.Ct
2380, 2388-89, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985).

no reference to, or indeed functions irrespective of, the existence of an ERISA
plan. Nor is the cost of defending this
lawsuit a mere administrative burden.
Here, the existence of a pension plan is a
critical factor in establishing liability under
the State's wrongful discharge law. As a
result, this cause of action relates not
merely to pension benefits, but to the essence of the pension plan itself.
[5] We have no difficulty in concluding
that the cause of action which the Texas
Supreme Court recognized here—a claim
that the employer wrongfully terminated
plaintiff primarily because of the employer's desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the employee's pension
fund—"relatefs] to" an ERISA-covered
plan within the meaning of § 514(a), and is
therefore pre-empted.

Notwithstanding its breadth, we have
recognized limits to ERISA's pre-emption
clause. In Mackey v. Lanier Collection
Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 108
S.Ct 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988), the
Court held that ERISA did not pre-empt a
State's general garnishment statute, even
though it was applied to collect judgments
against plan participants. Id, at 841, 108
S.Ct, at 2191. The fact that collection
might burden the administration of a plan
did not, by itself, compel pre-emption.
Moreover, under the plain language of
§ 514(a) the Court has held that only state
laws that relate to benefit plans are preempted. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 23,107 S.Ct 2211, 222324, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). Thus, even though
a state law required payment of severance
benefits, which would normally fall within
the purview of ERISA, it was not pre-empted because the statute did not require the
establishment or maintenance of an ongoing plan. Id, at 12, 107 S.Ct, at 2217-18.

"[W]e have virtually taken it for granted
that state laws which are 'specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans' are
pre-empted under § 514(a)." Mackey, supra, 486 U.S., at 829, 108 S.Ct, at 2185. In
Mackey the statute's express reference to
ERISA plans established that it was so
designed; consequently, it was pre-empted.
The facts here are slightly different but
the principle is the same: The Texas cause
of action makes specific reference to, and
indeed is premised on, the existence of a
pension plan. In the words of the Texas
court, the cause of action "allows recovery
when the plaintiff proves that the principal
reason f DT his termination ^aa the empicryer's desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the employee's pension
fund" 779 S.W.2d, at 71. Thus, in order
to prevail, a plaintiff must plead, and the
court must find, that an ERISA plan exists
and the employer had a pension-defeating
motive in terminating the employment
Because the court's inquiry must be directed to the plan, this judicially created cause
of action "relatefs] to" an ERISA plan.

Neither of these limitations is applicable
to this case. We are not dealing here with
a renerallv aDDlicable statute that makes

McClendon argues that the pension plan
is irrelevant to the Texas cause of action
because all that is at issue is the employ-
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er's improper motive to avoid its pension
obligations. The argument misses the
point, which is that under the Texas court's
analysis there simply is no cause of action
if there is no plan.
[6] Similarly unavailing is McClendon's
argument that § 514(a) is limited by the
narrower language of § 514(cX2) which
provides:
"The term 'State' includes a State, any
political subdivisions thereof, or any
agency or instrumentality of either,
which purports to regulate, directly or
indirectly, the terms and conditions of
employee benefit plans covered by this
subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(cX2).
McClendon argues that § 514(cX2)'s limiting language causes § 514(a) to pre-empt
only those state laws that affect plan
terms, conditions, or administration. Since
the cause of action recognized by the Texas
court does not focus on those items but
rather on the employer's termination decision, McClendon claims that there can be
no pre-emption here.
The flaw in this argument is that it misreads § 514(cX2) and consequently misapprehends its purpose. The ERISA definition of "State" is found in § 3(10), which
defines the term as "any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto
- Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa,
Guam, Wake Island, and the Canal Zone."
29 U.S.C. § 1002(10). Section 514(cX2) expands, rather than restricts, that definition
for pre-emption purposes in order to "include" state agencies and instrumentalities whose actions might not otherwise be
considered state law. Had-Congress intended to restrict ERISA's pre-emptive effect to state laws purporting to regulate
plan terms and conditions, it surely would
not have done so by placing the restriction
in an adjunct definition section while using
the broad phrase "relate to" in the preemption section itself.
Moreover, if
§ 514(a) were construed as McClendon
urges, the "relate to" language would be
superfluous—Congress need only have said
that "all" state laws would be pre-empted

Moreover, our precedents foreclose this argument In Mackey the Court held that
ERISA pre-empted a Georgia garnishment
statute that excluded from, garnishment
ERISA plan benefit&T'"Mackey~ supra, 486
U.S., at 828, and n. 2/829, 108 S.Ct, at
2184, and n. 2, 2185. Such a law clearly did
not regulate the terms or conditions of
ERISA-covered plans, and yet we found
pre-emption. Mackey demonstrates that
§ 514(a) cannot be read so restrictively.
The conclusion that the cause of action in
this case is pre-empted by § 514(a) is supported by our understanding of the purposes of that provision. Section 514(a) was
intended to ensure that plans and plan
sponsors would be subject to a uniform
body of benefit law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives
among States or between States and the
Federal Government. Otherwise, the inefficiencies created could work to the detriment of plan beneficiaries. FMC Corp.,
498 U.S., at
, 111 S.Ct, at 408 (citing
Fort Halifax, 482 U.S., at 10-11, 107 S.Ct,
at 2216-17); Shaw, 463 U.S., at 105, and n.
25, 103 S.Ct, at 2904, and n. 25. Allowing
state based actions like the one at issue
here would subject plans and plan sponsors
to burdens not unlike those that Congress
sought to foreclose through § 514(a). Particularly disruptive fa the potential for conflict in substantive law. It is foreseeable
that state courts, exercising their common
law powers, might develop different substantive standards applicable to the same
employer conduct, requiring the tailoring
of plans and employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each jurisdiction.
Such an outcome is fundamentally at odds
with the goal of uniformity that Congress
sought to implement
B
[7] Even if there were no express preemption in this case, the Texas cause of
action would be pre-empted because it conflicts directly with an ERISA cause of ac-
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tion. McClendon's claim falls squarely
withm the ambit of ERISA § 510, which
provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to
discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any
right to which he is entitled under the
provisions of an employee benefit plan
. . . or for the purpose of interfering
with the attainment of any right to
which such participant may become entitled under the p l a n . . . . " 29 U.S.C.
§ 1140 (emphasis added).
By its terms § 510 protects plan participants from termination motivated by an
employer's desire to prevent a pension
from vesting. Congress viewed this section as a crucial part of ERISA because,
without it, employers would be able to circumvent the provision of promised benefits. S.Rep. No. 93-127, pp. 35-36 (1973);
H.R.Rep. No. 93-533, p. 17 (1973). We
have no doubt that this claim is prototypical of the kind Congress intended to cover
under § 510.
"[T]he mere existence of a federal regulatory or enforcement scheme," however,
even a considerably detailed one, "does not
by itself imply pre-emption of state remedies." English v. General Electric Co.,
496 U.S.
,
, 110 S.Ct 2270, 2279,
110 L.E<L2d 65 (1990). Accordingly, "'we
must look for special features warranting
pre-emption/" Ibid (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719,105 S.Ct
2371, 2378, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985)).
Of particular relevance in this inquiry is
§ 502(a)—ERISA's civil enforcement mechanism. That section as set forth in 29
U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(3), (e), provides, in pertinent part:
"A civil action may be brought—
"(3) by a participant . . . (A) to enjoin
any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter or the terms
of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
violations or (ii) to enforce anv provisions
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of this subchapter or the terms of the
p\an;
"(eXl) Except for actions under subsection (aXIXB) of this section, the district courts of the United States shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter brought by
. . . a participant" (Emphasis added.)
In Pilot Life we examined this section at
some length and explained that" Congress
intended § 502(a) to be the exclusive remedy for rights guaranteed under ERISA,
including those provided by § 510:
"[TJhe detailed provisions of § 502(a)
set forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful
balancing of the need for prompt and fair
claims settlement procedures against the
public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans. The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of
certain remedies and the exclusion of
others under the federal scheme would
be completely undermined if ERISA-plan
participants and beneficiaries were free
to obtain remedies under state law that
Congress rejected in ERISA. The six
carefully integrated civil enforcement
provisions found in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted . . . provide strong
evidence that Congress did not intend to
authorize other remedies that it simply
forgot to incorporate expressly.' " 481
U.S., at 54, 107 S.Ct, at 1556 (quoting
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146, 105 S.Ct
3085, 3092, 87 L.Ed.2d 96 (1985)).
It is clear to us that the exclusive remedy provided by § 502(a) is precisely the
kind of " 'special featur[e]' " that " 'warrants] pre-emption'" in this case. English, supra, 496 U.S., at
, 110 S.Ct, at
2279; see also Automated Medical, supra,
471 U.S., at 719, 105 S.Ct, at 2378. As we
explained in Pilot Life, ERISA's legislative
history makes clear that "the pre-emptive
force of § 502(a) was modeled on the exclusive remedv provided bv § 301 of the Labor
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Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA),
61 Stat 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185." 481 U.S., at
52, 107 S.Ct, at 1555-56; id., at 54-55, 107
S.Ct, at 1556-57 (citing H.R.Conf.Rep. No.
93-1280, p. 327 (1974)). "Congress was
well aware that the powerful pre-emptive
force of § 301 of the LMRA displaced" all
state-law claims, "even when the state action purported to authorize a remedy unavailable under the federal provision." Pilot Life, 481 U.S., at 55, 107 S.Ct, at 1557.
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, v. Taylor,
481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct 1542, 95 LEd.2d 55
(1987), we again drew upon the parallel
between § 502(a) and § 301 of the LMRA
to support our conclusion that the pre-emptive effect of § 502(a) was so complete that
an ERISA pre-emption defense provides a
sufficient basis for removal of a cause of
action to the federal forum notwithstanding the traditional limitation imposed by
the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. Id., at
64-67, 107 S.Ct, at 1546-$.
[8] We rely on this same evidence in
concluding that the requirements of conflict pre-emption are satisfied in this case.
Unquestionably, the Texas cause of action
purports to provide a remedy for the violation of a right expressly guaranteed by
§ 510 and exclusively enforced by § 502(a).
Accordingly we hold that " '[wjhen it is
clear or may fairly be assumed that the
activities which a State purports to-regulate are protected" by § 510 of ERISA,
"due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield'"
Cf. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic
Chef Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409, n. 8, 108 S.Ct
1877, 1883, n. 8, 100 L.EdJ2d 410 (1988).
[9] The preceding discussion also responds to the Texas court's attempt to distinguish this case as not one within
ERISA's purview. Not only is § 502(a) the
exclusive
remedy
for
vindicating
§ 510-protected rights, there is no basis in
§ 502(a)'s language for limiting ERISA actions to only those which seek "pension
benefits." It is clear that the relief requested here is well within the power of
* * -i —.,_*„ 4.^ nmvi^o fYm<u>fiuenUv. it

is no answer to a pre-emption argument •
that a particular plaintiff is not seeking
recovery of pension benefits.
The judgment of the Texas Supreme
Court is reversed.
It is so ordered

Robert S. MINNICK, Petitioner
v,
MISSISSIPPI.
No. 89-6332.
Argued Oct 3, 1990.
Decided Dec. 3, 1990.

Defendant was convicted in the Circuit
Court, Lowndes County, Mississippi, Lester
F. Williamson, J., of two counts of capital
murder, and he appealed. The Supreme
Court of Mississippi, 551 So.2d 77, affirmed, and certiorari was granted. The
Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy, held that
where accused had requested and been provided counsel, reinitiation of interrogation
in interview which accused was compelled
to attend without counsel was impermissible.
Reversed and remanded.
Justice Scalia filed dissenting opinion
in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined.
Justice Souter did not participate.

1. Criminal Law e=»412.2(4), 517.2(1), 641.3(6)
Fifth Amendment protection against
reinitiation of questioning of accused who
has requested assistance of counsel is not
terminated or suspended when suspect has
consulted with an attorney; officials may
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
Philip J. Adams, Jr. of Uatson, E s s ; Marshall & Enggas ; Kansas City, Missouri
(Dwight D. Sutherland; Jr. of Uatson, E s s , Marshall & Enggas, Olathe, K a n s a s ,
with him on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Anthony F. Rupp of Shughart, Thompson & Kilroy, P.C., Overland Park, Kansas
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Missouri, and Guy E. McGaughey, Jr. of McGaughey & McGaughey, Ltd.,
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Before MOORE, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit

Judge.

*1 Plaintiff Patricia Joanne Settles brouqht suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging that defendant Golden Rule
Insurance Company's actions in terminating her husband's insurance coverage
caused him to have a heart attack and die. Jurisdiction is based on diversity
of citizenship.
Plaintiff's cause
of action specifically alleged state law
claims of breach of contract, the tort of outrage, fraudulent denial of
insurance coverage, and wrongful death.
The district court, in response to
defendant's motion to dismiss, held that the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) preempted plaintiff's state law claims and dismissed the
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. [FN11
Arguing that ERISA does not preempt her state law claims, plaintiff appeals the
district court's order dismissing her cause of action against Golden Rule. We
aff i rm.
BACKGROUND
We recite the facts as they are alleged in the plaintiff's complaint.
In
1 9 8 4 , plaintiff's husband, William L. Settles, was employed as an accounting
clerk for the Long Motor Corporation (Long Motor) of Lenexa, Kansas. As an
employment benefit, Mr. Settles was insured under a group policy issued by
defendant which provided both life and health insurance. Under the group
insurance policy, Long Motor paid a monthly premium to defendant and was
required to give advance written notice to defendant if it intended to
terminate coverage of an employee.
On October 17, 1986, Mr. Settles was advised by a representative of defendant
that his health insurance coverage had been terminated.
However, on October
2 2 , 1986, Mr. Settles was told by an agent of defendant that his health
insurance coverage had not been terminated and that he had effectively
exercised an extension of his health insurance coverage. On October 2 4 , 1986.
Mr. Settles was notified by defendant that it had unilaterally terminated his
COPR. (C) WEST 1991 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOUT. WORKS
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health insurance coverage effective October 7, 1986. Plaintiff alleges that as
a direct consequence of defendant's actions in terminating her husband's health
insurance, he became severely depressed and suffered a heart attack on October
2 4 , 1986. As a result of the heart attack, Mr. Settles died on October 2 9 ,
19S6.
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging breach of contract, the tort
of outrage, fraudulent denial of insurance coverage, and wrongful death under
Kansas law. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss-, arguing both that ERISA
preempted plaintiff's state law claims, and alternatively that plaintiff had
failed to state a claim under Kansas Law. The district court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that ERISA preempted plaintiff's claim.
Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. C o . , 715 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Kan. 1989).
Arguing
that
there were insufficient facts before the district court for it to find
that ERISA applied to Long Motor's employee benefit plan and that ERISA does
not preempt her wrongful death claim, plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her
cause of action.
DISCUSS ION
*2 We review de novo the granting of a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim for which relief can be granted, and we presume that the
allegations o't the complaint ara true. See Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792
F.2d 975, 978 (10th Ci r. 1986).
In reviewing the dismissal, we must determine
whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support her claim.
Id.
A. Whether ERISA Preemption Can Be Raised as a Defense in this Case.
ERISA applies only to benefit plans or re red by employers engaged in interstate
commerce.
See 29 U.S.C. s 1003(a)(1).
On appeal, plaintiff first argues that
ERISA cannot be applied to this case because there was no evidence before the
district court which proved that Long Motor was engaged in business affecting
interstate commerce. The defendant has the burden of proving the preemption
defense.
See Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 492 n.4
(9th Cir. 1 9 8 8 ) , cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 3216 (1989).
However, because
plaintiff's complaint pleads ample facts to support the conclusion that Long
Motor participated in business affecting interstate commerce, we find that
plaintiff conceded that issue. [FN2]
Plaintiff also argues that because she brought her action in diversity and did
not raise any claims under ERISA in her complaint, we should look only to her
complaint to establish jurisdiction.
However,
in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 5 8 , 63-64 ( 1 9 8 7 ) , the Court held that an action alleging
only state law claims is removable to federal court if it gives rise to the
defense of ERISA preemption.
The Court explained that "tolne corollary of the
well-pleaded complaint rule developed in the case law ... is that Congress may
so completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this
select group of claims is necessarily federal in character."
Id. See also
lngersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 59 U.S.L.W. 4033 (1990).
Plaintiff's
complaint alleged sufficient facts for the district court to determine whether
it gave rise to the defense of ERISA preemption. The district court did not
err
in considering whether plaintiff's claims were preempted by ERISA.
B. Whether ERISA Preempts Plaintiff's Wrongful Death Claim.
Because the defense of ERISA preemption was properly considered by the
district court, we must now determine whether the district court properly held
that ERISA preempted plaintiff's wrongful death claim under Kansas law.
COPR. (C) WEST 1991 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOUT. WORKS
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Section 514(a) of ERISA states that:
"Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section ; the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt untte'r *~sec t fon 1003(b)
of this title."
29 Li.S.C. s 1144(a) (emphasis added).
In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 4 1 ; 48 (1987), the Supreme Court held that ERISA preempts state common law
causes o^ action that assert improper processing of claims under a benefit plan
regulated by ERISA.
In so holding, the Court emphasized that ERISA's
preemption provision is not limited to state laws specifically designed to
affect employee benefit plans. The Court noted that the preemption provision
is "deliberately expansive/' id. at 46 ; and that the statutory "phrase 'relate
to 1 [ils given its broad common-sense meaning." Id. at 4 7 ; quoting Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 8 5 , 97-98 (1983).
The Court has specifically stated
that a law relates to a benefit plan "if it has a connection with or reference
to such a plan." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts; 471 U.S. 7 2 4 ;
739 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ; quoting Shaw ; 463 U.S. at 97. The Court in Ingerso11-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 59 U.S.L.U. 4033 (1990) once again emphasized that preemption
under s 514(a) must be interpreted expansively. There it held that s 5 1 4 ( a )
preempted a claim that an employer wrongfully terminated an employee in order
to avoid contributing to ; or paying benefits under ; an employee pension fund.
*3 The Tenth Circuit has given a similarly broad reading to the phrase
"relate to" and has found that common law tort and breach of contract claims
are preempted by ERISA if the factual basis of the cause of action involves an
employee benefit plan. S e e ; e.g.; Kelley v. Sears ; Roebuck and Co., 882 F.2d
453 (10th Cir. 1989); Straub v. Western Union Telegraph; 851 F.2d 1262 (10th
Cir.
1988), Other circuits have likewise held that common law tort and
contract claims may be preempted by ERISA. See ; e.g. ; Pane v. RCA Corp. ; 868
F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1 9 8 9 ) ; Johnson v. District 2 Marine Eng. Beneficial Ass'n,
857 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1988).
However ; ERISA does not preempt claims that are only tangentially involved
with a benefit plan. See Shaw ; 463 U.S. at 100 n.21; Clark v. Coats & Clark,
Inc.; 865 F.2d 1 2 3 7 ; 1243-44 (11th Cir. 1989): see also Ethridge v. Harbor
House Restaurant; 861 F.2d 1389 ; 1404 (9th Cir. 1988): Giardieflo v. Balboa
Ins. C o . ; 837 F.2d 1566, 1571 n.8 (11th Cir. 1988) (ERISA preemption "does not
extend to every state law claim that, however remotely ; factually involves an
employee benefit p l a n , " ) .
In Clark, the court held that Clark's claim of
wrongful discharge was not preempted because the complaint:
"alludes to conduct which was proximate tor even concurrent) in time to the
alleged ERISA violation; but wholly remote in content.
... In its present
form; the complaint makes no statement which ties together the tort claim and
the ERISA claim in such a way that one 'relates to 1 the other in the statutory
sense-. "
Clark, 865 F.2d at 1243-44 (emphasis in original).
The present case is distinguishable from Clark and those other cases that held
state law claims not preempted by ERISA because here the in jury a 1 leged was a
direct result of the termination of plan benefits and cannot be characterized
as "wholly remote" from the benefit plan. See, e.g., Farlow v. Union Cent.
Life. Ins. C o . , 874 F.2d 7 9 1 , 794 (11th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing Clark
COPR. (C) WEST 1991 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOUT. UORKS
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because in Farlow the "alleged conduct is intertwined with the refusal to pay
benefi ts" ) .
The factual basis for each of plaintiff's state law claims directly concerns
the alleged improper administration of the benefit plan. Although plaintiff is
not seeking benefits under the insurance policy ; her claims require a finding
that defendant wrongfully terminated ftr. Settles' insurance coverage.
Therefore, the claims relate to the employee benefit plan.
Plaintiff alleges
in her compla int tha t:
"(als a direct result of the defendants' termination of insurance and breach
of the insurance contract, decedent Willi am L. Settles became severely
emotionally distressed, suffered extreme mental anguish and was caused to
suffer [a heart attack] ."
R. Doc. 1 at P 16; see also id. at P 3 2 , 4 4 , 53. |«je hold that, because
plaintiff's claims "relate to" an employee benefit plan covered by ERISA, they
are preempted by ERISA.
See 29 U.S.C. s 1144(a) (s 514(a) of E R I S A ) ,
*4 Plaintiff argues that even if her other claims are preempted by ERISA,
her wrongful death claim is not preempted.
However, because Kansas' wrongful
death statute limits causes of actions to those that the decedent could have
brought had he lived, plaintiff's wrongful death claim must be analyzed like
any other state law claim.
The wrongful death statute in Kansas provides that:
"If the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or the omission of
another, an action may be maintained for the damages resulting therefrom if the
former might have maintained the action had he or she lived, in accordance with
the provisions of this article, against the wrongdoer, or his or her personal
representative if he or she is deceased."
Kan. Stat. Ann. s 60-1901 (emphasis added).
Had Mr. Settles survived the
wrongful termination of his benefits, any claim that he could have brought
based on the wrongful termination of his benefits would have been barred bv
ERISA because it would have related to his employee benefit plan.
Therefore,
because the decedent could not have brought suit under these facts, plaintiff's
wrongful death claim is similarly barred.
Plaintiff's argument that the legislative history of ERISA demonstrates that
Congress did not intend ERISA to preempt state law wrongful death actions is
flawed.
First plaintiff relies in large part on a House Report which was
prepared subsequent to the original passage of s 514(a) and which discussed a
House Bill which ultimately was not adopted by Congress, See Appellant's 8r.
at 12-13, citing H.R. Rep. No. 8 0 1 , 100th Cong,, 2d Sess., pt. 2 , at 63
(1988).
Therefore, the legislative history cited by plaintiff does not give a
clear indication of congressional intent in drafting s 5 1 4 ( a ) .
See Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 1 0 2 , 117-18
(1980) (subsequent statements sre not clear indication of original
congressional intent).
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Pilot Life reviewed the
legislative history of ERISA when it found that the preemption provision of
ERISA.was written to be "deliberately expansive."
481 U.S. at 45-47.
One
commentator explains that:
"the Court has shown deep sensitivity to congressional intent regarding
preemption.
Alessi, Shaw, and Pilot Life demonstrate that ERISA must prevail
where any potential conflict between ERISA and a state statute or state law
cause of action exists, or where a state statute or state law cause of action
may in any way hinder the development of a uniform body of federal labor law
COPR. (C) WEST 1991 NO CLAIM TG QRIG. U.S. GOUT. WORKS
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governing employee benefit plans."
Steinman, Federal
Preemption:
The Labor Management Relations Act and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 1988 Ann. Surv. of Am. L. 7 3 9 ,
777 (footnotes o m i t t e d ) .
Plaintiff's interpretation of the legislative history
is overly restrictive and conflicts with the Supreme Lour t ' s *££.adi_ng~ o f the
legislative history. Therefore; we reject plaintiff's legislative history
argument.
*5 Plaintiff also argues that because 29 U . S . C . s 1132(a)(3)(B) authorizes
the courts to use "other appropriate equitable relief" to redress ERISA
violations; the court should allow state wrongful death claims as a form of
equitable relief.
Plaintiff's reading of s 1132(a)(3)(G) is not persuasive.
Giving courts flexibility in granting relief should not be confused with giving
courts power to e'jade
the broad preemption provision enacted by Congress.
The
Supreme Court in Pilot Life held that s 1132(a) is "the exclusive vehicle for
actions by ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper
processing of a claim for b e n e f i t s ; and that varying state causes of action for
claims within the scope of [s 1132(a) ] would pose an obstacle to the purposes
and objectives of Congress."
4Q1 U.S. at 52. In Massachusetts Mutual Life ins.
Co. v. Russell. 473 U.S. 134, 1 4 6 ; 147 (1985), the Court explained that
Congress had created an "interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent
remedial scheme" which the Court is "reluctant to tamper with."
If we were to
read s 1132(a)(3) as permitting plaintiff's state wrongful death action, we
would be tampering unnecessarily with the remedial scheme designed by
Congress.
Cf. Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1297 (5th Cir.
1989) (s 1132(a)(3)VB) does not permit the creation of an ERISA cause of action
based on an oral c o n t r a c t ) .
Therefore, s 1132(a)(3)(B) cannot be read as
permitting plaintiff's wrongful death claim.
CONCLUSION
Because the facts asserted in support of plaintiff's state law claims,
including her wrongful death claim, directly relate to an employee benefit plan
covered by ERISA, plaintiff's state law claims are preempted by s 514(a)
of
ERISA. CFN33
Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court's June 8, 1939 order
dismissing plaintiff's claims against defendant Golden Rule Insurance Company.
FNl/The district court dismissed the cause of action only as against
Golden Rule Insurance Company and entered a final judgment pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 5 4 ( b ) .
Therefore, the present appeal only addresses whether the
cause of action against Golden Rule was properly dismissed.
Plaintiff's complaint also listed Jim Toyne Insurance, Inc., as a
defendant.
The district
court retains jurisdiction of the cause of action
against Jim Toyne Insurance, Inc. On September 2 1 , 1989, the district court
stayed the proceedings against Jim Toyne Insurance, Inc., pending this
appea1.
FN2 Additionally, plaintiff's argument that Mr. Settles extended his
health insurance coverage creating a new contract which was not an
employment benefit and therefore not covered by ERISA was not raised
below.
Consequently, we do not consider it on appeal.
See Curtis
Ambulance v. Shawnee, 811 F.2d 1371, 1386 (10th Cir. 1987).
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FN3 Because the district court properly held that plaintiff's suit was
preempted by ERISA, we do not reach defendant's alternative argument that
plaintiff's suit failed to state any claim upon which relief could be
granted under Kansas law.
C.A.10, 1991
Settles v. Golden Rule Ins.
--- F.2d
, 1991 U)L 26223 (10th C:r.(Kan.))
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